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Abstract  
Public opinion has an impact on states‟ foreign policy. In the case of Georgia, the pro-Russian or pro-
United States attitude among the people is determined by several factors. The strategic value of Georgia for these 
two most powerful states in the world makes their study of the mass opinion‟s preferences toward major power 
an interesting and a valuable one. In this article, I test two sets of factors that shape the individual preferences 
toward major powers and employ logistic regression model to explain the relationship between four independent 
variables with the dependent variable. I argue that religiosity, the role of government, and economic satisfaction 
are still the best predictors of the pro-Russian policy. 
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Abstrak  
Kebijakan luar negeri suatu negara dipengaruhi oleh pendapat para masyarakatnya. Pertanyaannya 
adalah apa yang mempengaruhi pandangan masyarakat mengenai kebijakan yang selayaknya diambil oleh 
pemerintah? Artikel ini meneliti faktor-faktor yang dapat mempengaruhi pandangan masyarakat di Georgia 
mengenai rekan ideal bagi negara mereka. Georgia sendiri merupakan negara yang memiliki nilai strategis bagi 
negara besar seperti Rusia dan Amerika. Oleh karenanya, kajian mengenai determinan opini publik mengenai 
siapa diantara kedua negara besar tersebut yang layak menjadi mitra Georgia penting untuk dilakukan. Melalui 
metode kuantitatif, khususnya pendekatan regresi logistik, artikel ini berusaha melanjutkan penelitian yang 
terdahulu. Penelitian sebelumnya melihat korelasi antara faktor agama, peran pemerintah, dan kepuasan 
ekonomi dengan pilihan masyarakat terhadap mitra kerjasama luar negeri Georgia. Satu hal yang luput dari 
penelitian sebelumnya adalah peran nilai politik. Berdasar analisa melalui model regresi logistik, faktor agama, 
peran pemerintah, dan kepuasan ekonomi masih menjadi faktor penentu utama pilihan masyarakat Georgia 
mengenai siapa diantara Amerika dan Rusia yang dianggap ideal menjadi mitra hubungan bilateral negara 
mereka. 
 
Kata kunci: georgia; opini publik; rusia; amerika; regresi logistik. 
 
Introduction  
What explains the variation of foreign 
policy preferences at the individual level? This 
is one of the most central, yet understudied 
topics in the field of Foreign Policy Analysis. 
 
 
1
The author thanks, Alan James Simmons, Dr. 
David S. Siroky, Hao Wang, and students at the 
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There are several reasons why studying this 
topic matters. First, understanding the role of 
public opinion is important because it can 
create a constraint, support, or shape foreign 
policy.
2
 
 
The public opinion is often latent on 
foreign policy issues.
3
 This is consistent with 
 
 
 
2Steve Chan, and William Safran. “Public Opinion 
as a Constraint against War: Democracies‟ 
Responses to Operation Iraqi Freedom." Foreign 
Policy Analysis Vol.2 No. 2(2006):137-156; 
 
Matthew A. Baum, and Phillip B.K. Potter. “The 
 
 
Relationship Between Mass Media, Public Opinion 
And Foreign Policy: Toward A Theoretical 
Synthesis." Annual Review of Political Science 11 
2008:43-45. 
 
 
3 Philip J. Powlick, and Andrew Z. Katz. “Defining 
the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy 
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the conventional wisdom that says the public 
are often disengaged, and indifferent to 
international affairs. By latent opinion, it 
means ingrained sets of values, criteria for 
judgment, attitudes, and preferences come into 
play when relevant action, event, or proposal 
arises. 
 
Latent opinion has the potential to 
constraint foreign policy officials. Philip J. 
Powlick and Andrew Z. Katz argue that 
decision makers must anticipate the future 
impact of current policies because it has the 
potential to become activated through major 
media coverage that is compatible with public 
frames of reference.
4
 This major media 
coverage is usually facilitated by elite debate 
among highly credible expert commentators 
and government officials. Powlick and Katz 
contend that decision makers do not always 
have to worry about what the citizens say all 
the time because the public engages in foreign 
affairs only under the certain condition.
5
 
 
Public opinion can serve as an 
important tool for leaders to achieve a policy 
success. Eshbaugh-Soha and Linebarger, for 
example, note that the president does need 
public support and he can shape the public 
opinion. He goes on to say that, the way the 
president frames the issue of war in his 
presidential address or the tone of the 
presidential rhetoric increases the citizens‟ 
support for the way the president handles the 
war, and this is shown in the case of Iraq war.
6
 
 
Second, the study of public opinion is 
important because scholars of public opinion 
seem to have reached a consensus that the 
public can develop and hold coherent views on 
foreign policy. Although the citizens do not 
always closely pay attention to the details of 
international politics and have significant 
 
 
Nexus. Mershon International Studies Review 42 
(1998): 33. 
4 Ibid.,33.   
5 Ibid.,29.   
6 Matthew   Eshbaugh-Soha,,   and   Christopher   
Linebarger.“Presidential and Media Leadership of 
 
Public Opinion on Iraq." Foreign Policy Analysis 
  
10 No. 4 (2014): 351-369.  
 
 
informational disadvantage vis-à-vis leaders or 
the key foreign policy makers, they 
compensate by employing other cues that allow 
them to make judgments with the limited 
information that is available to them.
7
 
 
Third, there is little research on the 
way citizens form their opinion on foreign 
affairs. So far, scholars such as Daniel 
Novotny, David Siroky, Alan J. Simmons, and 
Giorgi Gvalia are interested in examining the 
elites‟ perception and their determinants.
8
  
There is, however, an emerging 
acknowledgment among scholars who study 
the role of domestic politics in shaping the 
state's foreign policy, which examines the 
individual level perception matters. A study by 
Siroky, Simmons, and Gvalia represents the 
most recent effort to understand public opinion 
on Georgians‟ most important political and 
economic partner. In their 2017‟s piece, they 
attempt to assess the mechanisms by which the 
public develop foreign policy preferences. 
 
In their attempt to unpack the causes of 
the variations in the public ‟ perception on the 
most appropriate bilateral partner for their 
country, they choose Georgia as a case study. 
They describe Georgia as one of post-Soviet 
battleground countries in the Eastern Europe, 
where the United States and Russia compete 
for influence.
9
 The strategic value of Georgia 
for these two most powerful states in the world 
makes their study of the mass opinion’s 
preferences toward major power an interesting 
and a valuable one, because it allows us to 
better think about the contemporary foreign 
policy challenges facing both domestic and 
foreign decision makers who try to forge a 
bilateral or trilateral relationship. 
 
 
7 Baum and Potter, 43-44.   
8 Daniel Novotny. Torn Between America and 
China: Elites Perception and Indonesian Foreign 
Policy. Singapore:Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies.2010.; Siroky, David S., Alan James 
  
Simmons and Giorgi Gvalia . “Vodka or Bourbon? 
  
Foreign Policy Preferences Toward Russia and the 
  
United States in Georgia”. Foreign Policy Analysis 
  
(2017): 2. 
 
9 Siroky, et.al, 3.  
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This paper, which focuses on the 
correlational study, seeks to advance the 
literature on the mass opinion by reexamining 
 
Siroky‟s, Simmons‟s, and Gevalia's arguments 
and studying the extent to which political value 
plays a role in shaping public opinion. They 
argue that religious factor, economic 
satisfaction, and individual perception on the 
role of government determine the mass attitude 
towards Russia and America. Their theory 
represents not only the latest explanation of 
one of the most important, yet understudied 
topic in Foreign Policy Analysis but also the 
most comprehensive argument about the public 
preferences and their determinants. 
 
I seek   to   replicate   and   expand 
 
Siroky‟s, Simmons‟s, and Gevalia's analysis 
by offering an alternative explanation they did 
not test for, which is a political value. As the 
research on determinants of individual 
preferences of Europeans supports toward the 
European Union, and the Central and Easter 
 
Europeans‟ choice of external partner 
demonstrate, political value constitutes one of 
the key determinants of individual foreign 
policy preference. 
 
I argue that the more people respect 
democracy, the lower their probability of 
siding with Russia in both political and 
economic terms, and the higher their 
probability of choosing the United States as the 
most preferred bilateral partner of their 
country, Georgia. This argument is then tested 
along with Siroky‟s, Simmons‟s, and Gevalia's 
explanation. On the whole, the results from the 
statistical study suggest that their explanation 
has stronger explanatory power compared to 
my argument in explaining people‟s decision 
to choose Russia or the United States as their 
country‟s external partner. Although a single 
case does not provide a strong basis to reject 
the theory that political value shapes individual 
foreign policy preference of political value, it 
should make the student of political science 
pause and call into question this idea. 
 
The remainder of this paper is divided 
into six sections. Following the introduction, 
 
 
the second section summarizes Siroky‟s, 
Simmons‟s, and Gevalia's theory, and 
introduces an alternative explanation of the 
individual preferences towards the major 
powers. The third section describes the 
research design and data that are used to test 
the hypothesis. The fourth section provides a 
logistic model to test the contending theories 
on individual preferences. The fifth section 
explains the results. The sixth section 
concludes and highlights the possible research 
avenues for future research on the relationship 
between public opinion and foreign policy. 
 
 
What determines the variations at the 
individual-level preferences toward major 
power? Contending theories and hypothesis 
to test 
 
The literature about the determinants of the 
individual-level preferences at the battleground 
or post-Soviet countries, whether they are pro-
Russia, pro-West such as the European Union, 
or pro-United States, within the Foreign Policy 
Analysis provides conflicting explanations on 
what generate such preferences. Siroky, 
Simmons, and Gvalia focus on three domestic 
factors that determine the individual‟s affinity 
towards either Russia or the US, which are 
religion, economic satisfaction, and the role of 
government. 
 
They point out that shared religious 
faith between two countries can influence the 
way people think about the proper direction for 
their country regarding external relations. They 
note that most observers argue that there is a 
religious similarity between Georgia and 
Russia. These two countries have a strong 
Orthodox Church influence. In Georgia, the 
Orthodox Church is an influential 
establishment in the society. They are often 
critical of the government policies, including 
the government‟s pro-Western policies, and try 
to mold public opinion.
10
 Given these facts, 
they propose the following hypothesis: 
 
 
 
10
 Siroky, Simmons, and Gvalia‟s,7. 
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H1: More religious individuals will be 
more likely to favor closer ties with Russia 
 
Their other hypothesis focuses on the 
individual‟s view of the role of the 
government. The existing studies of post-  
Socialist‟s societies‟  attitudes  towards  the 
 
European Union point out that the society of 
the former Soviet countries tends to see the 
government as parent. These people often 
reminisce of the good-old-days under the 
Soviet, where the government will do anything 
to “raise” them. Such nostalgia is apparently 
common among post-Soviet countries, where 
the older people would remember that they had 
everything in the past.
11
 These findings lead 
them to propose a second hypothesis, which is: 
H2: Individuals with a paternalistic view of 
government will be more likely to think that 
their country should forge closer political and 
economic ties with Russia 
 
The last factor that they think affects 
the people‟s affinity towards one of major 
power is the individual‟s perception of their 
economic status. In the context of the study on 
European integration, some scholars find out 
that people evaluate the benefit of a 
partnership with a country based on the cost 
and benefit of such external relation. Studies 
on post-Soviet countries find out that winners 
from the integration appear more likely to 
support the European Union membership. Such 
attitude is also apparent in the context of the 
post-Soviet countries‟ relation with the 
Western country, such as the United States.
12
 
Thus, these findings lead them to advance the 
third hypothesis: 
 
H3: Economic “losers” are more 
likely to favor closer ties with Russia 
 
In addition to the three determinants 
above, there are other possible explanations as to 
why individuals in post-Soviet countries develop 
a pro-Russian, or pro-Western attitude. The other 
possible explanations include the cultural and 
social economic background, and 
 
 
11 Siroky, Simmons, and Gvalia‟s,7.   
12 Siroky, Simmons, and Gvalia‟s,8.  
 
 
the role of informal social environments such 
as friends, acquaintances, colleagues, and 
neighbors as guidance in evaluating foreign 
policy issues.
13
 
 
The other factor that also plays a role 
in shaping the individual preferences of their 
county's external partner is political value. The 
literature on the study of Central and Eastern 
Europe points out that democratic and free-
market values, as well as positive attitudes 
towards minorities and liberal principles, lead 
to a high level of support for the European 
Integration.
14
 These countries view that the 
European Union is not only a valuable avenue 
to achieve economic gains, but also 
instrumental to improve the democracy and 
freedom in their country. 
 
The European Union (EU) is 
committed to supporting human rights, 
including the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities, democracy, equality, human 
dignity, and the rule of law.
15
 The EU is also 
built upon the principle of good governance, 
 
 
 
13 Andrej Nowak, Jacek Szamrej and Bibb Latane.   
“From  Private  Attitudes  to  Public  Opinion:  A 
 
 
Dynamic Theory of Social Impact." Psychological 
Review 97 No. 3(1990): 362–76. 
  
14 Rachel  Cichowski.  “Western  Dreams,  Eastern   
Realities: Support for the European Union in 
Central and Eastern Europe." Comparative Political 
Studies 33 No. 10(2000): 1243–78; Piret Ehin. 
  
“Determinants   of   Public   Support   for   EU 
  
Membership:  Data  from  the  Baltic  Countries," 
 
 
European Journal of Political Research 40 No.1 
(2001): 31–56; Joshua Tucker, Alexander Pacek 
and Adam Berinsky. “Transitional Winners and 
  
Losers: Attitudes towards EU Membership in Post- 
 
 
Communist Countries.” American Journal of 
Political Science 46 No. 3(2002): 557–71; 
Kazimierz M. Slomczynski, and Goldie Shabad 
 
 
“Dynamics of Support for European Integration in 
Post-Communist Poland.” European Journal of 
Political Research 42 No. 4 (2003): 503–39; 
Tanasoiu Cosmina, and Constantin Colonescu. 
  
“Determinants    of    Support    for    European 
  
Integration."   European   Union   Politics:   SAGE 
 
Publications 9 No. 3(2008): 363-377. 
 
15
European    Commission. "EU    Charter    of 
 
 
Fundamental Rights." Accessed April 30, 
2017.http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-
rights/charter/index_en.htm. 
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transparency, and the irreversibility of 
reforms.
16
 
 
The Eastern and Central European 
countries which underwent transition period 
and have little information about the EU based 
their decision to join the EU by looking at the 
political values attached to the idea of Europe. 
In their view, the Western Europe is more 
superior regarding political values. The EU is 
perceived to have a truly cosmopolitan 
outlook, where it embraces a variety of 
cultures, types of people, and ways of life, 
prosperous and democratic life. In contrast, the 
Eastern and Central European countries see 
their countries as underdeveloped, 
authoritarian, and provincial. Thus, the 
admiration for democratic value among people 
and the desire to live a better political life in 
these countries led them to support their 
countries membership in the EU.
17
 
 
The European Union is not the only 
entity which embraces democratic value. Some 
Scholars who study democracy and political 
culture in some of the Eastern European 
countries such as Klingemann, Fuchs, Zielonka 
note that countries from this part of the world 
associate democratic value with the United 
States. Although the people from this region 
think that democracy has its problem, many 
people think that it is better than any other 
form of government, such as the political 
system where the government is led by the 
army, or a strong leader who does not bother 
with parliament and elections.
18
 This 
conjecture leads me to a hypothesis that: 
 
H4: Those who value democracy, will be more 
supportive of political relations with the 
United States 
 
 
Since the political value, which is democratic 
value, is a political measurement, I expect that 
it correlates with only the political ties and not 
the economic ties. 
 
As the literature of public opinion in 
the context of EU, and Central and Eastern 
Europe show, the origin of democracy in the 
certain country is irrelevant in determining 
public‟s support for the choice of their 
country‟s foreign partners. Therefore, in the 
case of Georgia, it is irrelevant how Georgia 
ends up adopting certain type political system 
or value, for example, whether in the past, 
foreign involvement influences the 
democratization. 
 
Another point worth emphasizing is 
the plurality of political values among the 
society. Some people believe and support 
democratic or authoritarian values more than 
others. Even though the political system of 
their country is not a democracy, people can 
have an aspiration to live under democracy one 
day or vice versa. Hence, the supporter of 
democracy will prefer their country to make 
friendship with a democratic country as 
opposed to authoritarian country. 
 
Method, variables, and data
19
  
The data largely builds on the replication 
materials, including the codebook, and coding, 
that is provided by the authors, Siroky, 
Simmons, and Gvalia, which I obtained 
through personal correspondence with one of 
the author. These materials are also available 
online on the Harvard Dataverse website. The 
reason these three authors used the dataset on 
Knowledge and Attitude towards the European 
Union in Georgia in 2011 is that this dataset 
was the most recent dataset on Georgia when 
they wrote the paper.  
16
  Slomczynski, and Shabad,503-39; Tanasoiu and 
Colonescu,367. 
 
17
 Stephen  White,  Ian  McAllister  and  Margot  
Light.“Enlargement and   the   New   Outsiders.”  
Journal of Common Market Studies 40 No.1(2002): 
135–53 ; Tanasoiu and Colonescu,367.  
18
 Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Dieter Fuchs, and Jan 
Zielonka,eds. (USA:Routledge. 2006). 18,41. 
 
I use their dataset for the following 
dependent variables: political ties with Russia 
(POLRUS), economic ties with Russia 
(ECONRUS), political ties with America 
 
 
19
 The R code for this paper is available upon 
request. 
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(POLUS), and Economic Ties with America 
(ECONUS). 
 
Siroky, Simmons, and Gvalia ask two 
questions as the dependent variable. There are 
in total four tables, as you will see later in this 
paper. For the first two tables, the public 
response is measured using the survey 
question: "In your opinion, should Georgia 
have the closest political cooperation with 
Russia?". The responders are given two 
choices of an answer: "yes," and "no." In the 
second set of models, the dependent variable 
deals with economic cooperation with Russia. 
The question that the three authors ask is 
"Should Georgia have the closest economic 
cooperation with Russia?". There are two 
possible answers that the responders can 
choose: “yes," or "no." They three authors also 
pose a question about the public opinion 
toward the United States. The question and 
answer are the same as above, except that they 
replace America with Russia.
20
 
 
I also use their dataset for the three 
independent variables: Religiosity 
(RELSERV2), paternalism (GOVTROL2), and 
satisfaction with Income (CURRUNG2). In 
addition to that, I use and modify one variable 
that is related to the political value 
(ICITVOTE, ICITVOTE. ord). 
 
To measure religious belief, the 
surveyors ask how often the interviewees go to 
the church. The interviewers assign a score 
ranging from 1 to 5. One means frequent 
church attendance. Frequent attendance at 
church service reflects adherence to Orthodox 
Church teachings, something that Georgia and 
Russia shares in common, and exposes them to 
political values of the religious leaders in this 
Church.
21
 
 
In determining the level of 
paternalism, which refers to the idea that a 
government should play a role of parents for 
the citizens, the surveyors ask whether the 
interviewees agree or agree very strongly with 
the statement that people are like children, and 
 
20 Siroky, et.al, 8.   
21 Siroky, et.al, 6-7.  
 
 
the government should take care of them like a 
parent. The surveyors assign score 1 to 2, with 
one means strongly agree with the statement. 
Paternalism is very strong in a country like 
Russia, and some people in Georgia often 
reminisce about the good old day of the 
paternalistic system.
22
 
 
The third independent variable is 
measured by identifying people‟s economic 
condition under the current system. The 
surveyors ask the respondents to write the rung 
of the economic ladder they think their 
household stands on at present, with the first 
rung of this ladder to the lowest possible 
economic position in the society. Those who 
feel like they are the loser under the current 
economic system, which adopts a Western 
economic system, tend to yearn a closer 
relationship with Russia.
23
 
 
With regards to the measurement of 
the alternative independent variable, the 
political or the democratic value, I employ the 
Schumpeterian definition of democracy that 
centers on competitive elections.
24
 In the 
dataset, the variable of political value, which is 
the democratic value, is based on one main 
question “To be a good citizen, how important 
would you say it is for a person to vote in 
elections”, The interviewers assign score 1 to 4 
to the answer from respondents from -2 to 1, 
with four means very important.
25
 
 
Siroky, Simmons, and Gvalia also 
include other variables as controls such as 
 
Respondent‟s age (RESPAGE), respondent‟s 
education (EDUDGR2), travel to Russia 
(TRAVELRU2), travel to America 
(TRAVELUS2), belonging to the Orthodox 
Christian Faith (Ortho), urban residence 
 
 
22 Siroky, et.al, 7.   
23 Siroky, et.al, 7   
24 Steven Levitsky, and Lucan Way. Competitive 
Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold 
War. (Cambridge University Press. 2010),6. 
 
25 Caucasus  Research  Resource  Centers,  Georgia   
.2011. “Knowledge and attitudes toward the EU in 
Georgia, 2011.AccessedApril 30, 2011. 
http://caucasusbarometer.org/en/eu2011ge/downloa 
ds/.7. 
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(URBAN), ethnic Georgian (EG2), trust 
president of Georgia (TRUPRES2), knowledge 
of the Russian language (RusOnly2), and 
knowledge of the English language (EngOnly). 
These variables are held constant to assess the 
relationship between the main four 
independent variables and the independent 
variable.
26
 
 
The description of the independent, 
dependent, and control variables are available 
in their codebook which is also available 
online on the Harvard dataverse website.
27
 I 
use the R statistical programming language to 
analyze the relationship between the dependent 
variables, control variables, and independent 
variable. 
 
The descriptive statistics of the three 
original and one alternative independent 
variables are provided in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the  
Independent Variable 
 
 
Results 
 
Four sets of nine models are estimated 
to test four hypotheses. The results for all 
models in Table 1 and 2 showed that pro-
Russian attitude in both political and economic 
domains is driven by the three independent 
variables that Siroky, Simmons, and Gvalia 
propose. The significance of the relationship 
between the independent and dependent 
variable is summarized with the asterisks or 
stars attached to the independent variable. The 
higher the stars, the more statistically 
significant the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variable is. 
 
The model 8 in table 1 shows that the 
p-value of religiosity is significant, and the role 
of government and economic satisfaction are 
very significant. These three variables are still 
correlated with the pro-Russia attitude in the 
political domain when the model 9 in table 1 
includes the democratic value variable. The 
logistic model 9 in table 1 also shows that 
democratic value is not statistically significant 
(p-value is above 0.1). In other words, the 
democratic value cannot predict the 
probability, of the people of Georgia choosing 
Russia as the most preferred political partner 
for their country. 
 
To analyze the data, I use logistic 
regression model. This model is used because 
the outcome or independent variable is 
dichotomous or binary.
28
 As mentioned in the 
previous page, the responders of the survey 
only have two possible choices of answer 
when asked about their opinion towards both 
the US and Russia. 
 
 
 
26 Siroky, et.al, 7.   
27 David S. Siroky, Alan James Simmons and 
Giorgi Gvalia. "Replication Data for Vodka or 
Bourbon? Foreign Policy Preferences Toward 
  
Russia and the United States in Georgia”. Accessed 
 
 
April 30, 2017. 
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persiste 
ntId=doi:10.7910/DVN/A3HBWB. 
 
 
28 James E Monogan III. Political Analysis Using R. 
(USA: Springer.2015), 100. 
 
 
Table 1 also reports the AIC or 
Akaike Information Criterion, which is a good 
fit index. The model 9 in table 1 reports a 
lower AIC value compared to the other models 
in table 1. The lower AIC stems from the 
inclusion of the four independent variables, and 
the control variables. The AIC is used to 
determine if the sample data are consistent with 
the hypothesized relationships between the 
independent variables and the dependent 
variable. The low value indicates that the 
model has a good fit. 
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Table 2.   Determinants of Individual Support for Political Ties to Russia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In table 2, the logistic model establishes the 
relationship between the four independent 
variables and the pro-Russian attitude in the 2 
also shows that democratic value cannot 
predict the probability of the people of 
Georgia choosing Russia as the most preferred 
economic partner for their country. 
 
Table 2 also reports the AIC or 
Akaike Information Criterion, which is a good 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
economic realm. The model 9 in the table 2 
includes all four independent variables and 
control variables. The logistic model 9 in table 
fit index. The model 9 in table 2 reports a 
lower AIC value compared to the other models 
in table 2. The low value indicates that the 
model has a good fit. 
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Table 3. Determinants of Indvidual Support for Economic Ties to  
Russia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Turning to table 3, the result of the 
logistic model 9 in table 3 shows that age 
plays a role in people‟s decision to forge 
closer political ties with the United states. 
According to Siroky, Simmons, and Gvalia, 
the older people in Georgia are less likely to 
favor closer ties with the United States.
29
 
 
This model, however, does not provide 
support for hypothesis four, which argues that 
support for democratic value will lead to 
increased support for the political ties with the 
United States. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29
 Siroky, et.al, 10. 
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Table 4. Determinants of Individual Support for Political Ties to United  
States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The analysis also assesses the cause of 
pro-United States attitude. In table 4 model 9, 
age plays a role in people‟s decision to forge 
closer economic ties with the United states. 
According to Siroky, Simmons, and Gvalia , 
the older people in Georgia are less likely to 
favor closer ties with the United States.
30
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30
 Siroky, et.al, 10. 
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Table 5. Determinants of Individual Support for Economic Ties to United  
States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The preceding analysis suggests the 
following conclusions. First, the three 
independent variables that Siroky, Simmons, 
and Gvalia remain the best predictors of the 
decision of Georgian people to support Russia. 
 
Second, given the persistence of the 
great game or political competition among 
great powers such as between China and the 
United States, Russia and China, and United 
States and Russia in other parts of the globe, 
such as Southeast Asia, future research could 
apply the same method as what Siroky, 
Simmons, and Gvalia employ in their research 
to assess the causes of the individual attitude 
toward great powers. 
 
Third, future research should rely on 
better measurement and data of political value 
or democratic value to improve the present 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
research on the relationship between this 
variable and individual-level foreign policy 
preference. 
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